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PAC. TEL.

& TEL. CO.

V. PUBLIC UTILITIE:-< COM.

[S F. Nos. 17952, 17953.

In Bank.

13-l C.2rl

Feb. 28, 1950.1

THE PACU'IC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILiTIES COMMISSION OF THE S'f ATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Utilities - Rate Regulation - Basis of Rate rixing.-

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[I)j

Commissions have power to prevent a utility from passing on
to the ratepayers unr':!asonabie c~sts for materials and services, dnd to the extent tho t utilities secure materials and
services necessary to their business through contracts made
by arms-lenbth bargaining in the open market, the contract
price is crdinarily accepted. as the proper cost to the utility of
tht materials and 'ervices.
Id.-Public Utilities Act-Purpose.-The primary pur:--ose of
the Public Utilities Act (8tats. 1915, p. 115, as amended;
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6386) is to insure the public adequate service at reasonable rates without discrimination.
Id. - Regulation - Contracts.-Public Utilities Act, § 48, empowering the Public Utilities Commission to prescribe uniform
systems of account, relates t how transactions by utilities are
to be recorded and does not include by implication the power
to prescribe the terms and conditions of anv transac~ion that
will be reflected in ·the accounts.
Id. - Regulation - Contracts.-Public Utilities Ac~. . 52, requiring commission approval of securities issues, limits the
commission's control to the use to be made of funds raised by
securities issues, and does not by implication confer jurisdiction on the commission :.0 prescribe the terms on which a
utility may enter into contracts necessary for the conduct of
its business.
Id. - Regulat!on - Contracts.-The determination of vhat is
reasonable in conducting the business of a utility is the primary
responsibility of management, and the commission does not
have the power ~o prescribe terms of contracts and the practices of utilities and thus substitute its judgment as to what
is reasonable for that of t:te management.
Id.-Regulation-Conduct of Busineus.-In the absence of an
enabling statute meeting the requirements of due process, the
Public Utilities Commission cannot require the management of

[1) See 22 Cal.Jur. 68; 43 Am.Jur. 624.
?ticK. Dig. References: [1) Public Utilities, § 33; [2) . 'ublic
Utilities, § 1; [3-6, 8-11) Public Utilities, § 26; [7] Public Utilities, § 32.
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a utility to make such choices as whether it would be wise
business judgment to divert profits from the payment of Civ-i·
dends into fields that the utility has not theretofore entered
[7] Id.-Rate Regulation-Fixing Rates.-In the absen('t' of a
statute granting the Public Utilities Commission power to fix
minimum rates to prevent· injurious competition, there is a
"zone of reasonableness" within which a utility can 'b itF own
rates, and it is for the man~ement to decide what rates ,vithin
that zonE' are likely to prove most beneficial to the utility.
[8] ld.-Regulation-Relations Jletween Labor and Ma.::lal'nment.
-In the absence of statutory authorization. the Public Utilities Commission does not have .,ower to formUlate the labor
policies of utilities, ;;0 h wages or to arbitrate labor disputes.
[9] Id.-Regulation-Oontracts-Between A1Iillated Oorporations.
-In the absence of e%press statutory authority, the P-lb1ic
Utility Commission's control over contracts between affiliated
corporations is limited to disallowance of excessive payments
for the purpose of bing rates.
[10J Id.-Regulation-Contracts-Between AJliliated Oorpe :ationa.
-The policy of the Public Utilities Commission not 0 prescribe the terms of contracts betweer: affiliated corporations is
consistent with tile provisions of the Public Utilities Act, there
being nothing that contracts of public utilities affecting -ates
and services are subject to greater regulation when they are
between affiliated corporations than when they are not.
[11] Id.-Regulation-lJontracts-Between Amliated Oorpora-tions.
The Public utilities Commission may not disregard theseparate corporate entities of affiliated corporations for the purpose of e%tending its jurir. iiction so as to prescribe the terms
on which one corporatio!' may contract with the other for
eertain sp.rvices, where e%cessive payments are not e%acted by
one corporation 80 as to impair the capital of the other and
thus weaken the 1&tte1"8 ability to serve the public.

PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Public Utilities
Commission prescribing terms on which one telephone and
telegraph company may contract with another telephone and
telegraph company for certain services. Orders annulled.
Arthur T. George, Eugene M. Prince, Eugene D. Bennett
and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro for Petitioner.
Everett C. McKeage, Roderick B. Cas!';idy. Boris H. Lakusta,
Hal F. Wiggins, J. Thomason Phelps and Harold J. McCarthy
fol' Respondents.
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Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Roger
bergh, Assistant City Attorney, Dion R. Holm, City
(San Franr.isco), John W. Collier, City Attorney (v",J\.uunlU~
Archer Bowden, Assistant City Attorney, and Emuel J.
man for Real Parties in Interest.
TRA YNOR, J .-In two petitions for writs of review
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company attacks two
tually identical orders of the Public Utilities
prescribing the terms on which Pacific may contract with
American Telephone and Telegraph Company for certain
ices. Although the two orders grew out of separate rate
ceedings, they involve identical issues and may be treated as
American owns 87.93 per cent of the capital stock of
The commission found that American dominates Pacific and
that the contract between the two, whereby Pacific paid one,
per cent of its gross receipts for the services of American, was
not in fact a contract but an arbitrary exaction from Pacific
by its controlling parent company. It therefore entered its .
orders specifying the terms upon which Pacific could continue
its service contract with American. They provide: "It Is
Hereby Further Ordered that, as applied to its California
intrastate operations, applicant, the Pacific Telephone and "j~.'"
Telegraph Company, hereafter, shall pay to the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, for services rendered by
it or any of its affiliates to applicant, no more than the reason.'j
able cost incurred in the rendition of such services or the:!
reasonable value of said services, whichever is the lesser. That '1
in determining the reasonable value of any services rendered, ~
consideration shall be given, among other things, to what it .~
would reasonably cost applicant to perform such service with ~
its own organization. Services rendered to applicant, which,l
in the judgment of the Commission, are not reasonably reo ~.
quired by applicant shall not be paid for by applicant. Neither
applicant nor any officer, agent or servant of applicant. by
any device whatsoever or under any pretense or guise, directly
or indirectly, shall commit any act or engage in any conduct
which shall be calculated to circumvent or evade the intent
of this order.
"It Is Hereby Further Ordered that applicant shall file
with this Commission. bimonthly, a verified report showing
for the immediately preceding two-calendar-month period all
payments made by applicant to the American Telephone anei
Telegraph Company for services rendered to applicant by said
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American Telephone and Telegraph Company and/or any of
its affiliates, to~ether with an itemization of said services and
the amount paid by applicant for each type of sen'ice ren-.
«ered, such report to be filed not later than forty (40) days
after the close of the period which it covers. Said vel'ifit'd
report shall show, for each type of service rendered, the total
cost incurred by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company or its affiliates in the rendition of said service to applicant. and the payment therefor by applicant on an allocated
basil;, segregated 88 to company-wide. total California and
California intrastate operations. The first report shall be for
the months of January and February, 1949 and shall be filed
on or before April 9, 1949.
"It is Hereby Further Ordered that, as applied to its California intrastate operations, the amount of $2,250,000. on an
annual basis, shall be adopted by applicant as the base and
starting point for the program and procedurc prescribed by
this order and applicant shall be entitled to pay, on an annual
basis, to American Telephone and Telegraph Company said
amount for services rendered to applicant by American Telephone and Telegraph Company and/or its affiliates pursuant
to the license contract; provided, however, that said amount
shall be adjusted to a lesser or f!Teater amount as t.he facts
and circumstances may warrant, but, in no event. shall applicant pay more than $2,250,000 on an annual basis without
first seeking and receiving the authority of this Commission
so to do."
When these orders were entered the difference between
the amount Pacific was to pay on the basis of one per cent of
gross revenue as provided in the license contract and the
amount allowed by the commission on an allocated cost basis
was approximately $250,000. The commission was willing
to allow payment of $2,250.000; one per cent of gross revenue
was approximately $2,500,000. In these proceedings Pacific
is not challengin!? the power of the Public Utilities Commission to disallow, for rate fixin!? purposes, payments to American that it finds excessive.· Pacific contends, however, that
·Pacific does Dot concede that disallowance of any part of the payments was proper; it docs not attack the disnllownnee, however, believing that the court would not consider it in reviewing a rate-firing order
unless the rate finally fixed was confiscatory. (See, Mal'ket Street Ry.
Co. v. Railroad C017l., 24 Cal.2d 378,40:; [1:i0 P.2d 196]; American Toll
Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commis .•;on, 12 Cal.2fl 1~4. 1!lRl!l4 [83 P.2d 1];
Sal. Joaquin Light 4' -"ower Corp. v. Railroad (;o/lwluliion, 175 Cal.
76-77 [165 P. 16].)
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the commission has no jurisdiction to prescribe the terms on .
which it may contract with American.
[1] It is settled that commissions have power to prevent
a utility from passing on to the ratepayers unreasonable costs
for materials and services. (United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad
Com .• 278 U.S. 300, 320 [49 S.Ct. 150,73 L.Ed. 3901; Chicago
etc Railway Co. v. Wellman. 143 U.S. 339, 345-346 [12 S.Ct.
400, 36 L.Ed. 176].) To the extent that utilities secure
materials and services necessary to their business through
contracts made by arms-length bargaining in the open market,
the contract price is ordinarily accepted as the proper cost
to the utility of the materials and services. Since the advent
of the bolding company, however, that both controls and
provides services for a network of operating utilities, new
problems in regulation have arisen. When services are rendered to an operating utility by an affiliated company that
owns a controlling fraction of the stock of the operating company, the safeguards provided by arms-length bargaining are
absent, and commissions have been vigilant to protect the
rate-payers from excessive rates reflecting excessive payments
by operating companies to their parents. (See, Western Distno'g. Co. v. Public Servo Com., 285 U.S. 119, 126-127 [52
8.Ct. 283; 76 L.Ed. 655] ; Dayton Power « Light Co. v. Public
Util. Com., 292 U.S. 290, 295 [54 S.Ct. 647, 78 L.Ed. 1267].)
Many state legislatures, not satisfied that the indirect control
of payments between affiliated utility corporations through
rate regulation was adequate to protect the consumer and
investor from the possible abuses that could arise out of contracts between tbe affiliated corporations. enacted statutes
specifical1y granting to their commissions power to regulate
payments under such contracts. (See, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 957,
982-989.) Similar powers over gas and electric utilities have
been given to the Securities and Exchange Commission by the
federal Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 [49
Stats. 838, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq.]. (See, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 957.
989-999.) California. however, has not expressly granted such
power to the commission, and it is therefore necessary to determine whetber tbe power may be fairly implied from the
powers that have been granted.
[2] The primary purpose of tbe Public Utilities Act
[Stats. 1915, p. 115, as amended. 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
6386] is to insure the public adequate service at reasonable
rates without discrimination. (Pacific Tel. etc. CO. V. Eshl,eman, 166 Cal. 640, 663 [137 P. 1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822,
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50 L.R.A. N.S. 652) ; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com.,
173 Cal. 577, 582 [160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975] ; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Railroad Com., 13 Cal. 2d 89, 118 [87 P.2d 1055].) The
act grants to the commission broad regulatory powers, which
may conveniently be divided into two classes. The commisSiOll has been given broad powers to regulate the relationship
of the utility to the consumer; thus it can determine the
services that must be provided by the utility and the rates
therefor. It has also been given certain specific powers to
regulate the manner in which the utility provides the required
sen-ices to safeguard the utility's ability to serve the public
efficiently at reasonable rates; thus the commission must
approve the sale or encumbrance of operative property necessary or useful to the utility in the performance of its duties
(§ 51), and it must approve the issue of securities and may
specify the manner in which funds so raised may be spent.
(§ 52.) The act does not, however, specifically grant to the
commission power to regulate the contracts by which the
utility secures the labor, materials, and services necessary for
the conduct of its business, whether such contracts are made
with affiliated corporations or others.
[3] The commission contends that jurisdiction may be
implied from the provisions of section 48 of the act empowering
the commission to prescribe uniform systems of accounts.
This power, however, relates, not to what transactions are to
be made, but to how they are to be recorded. It enables the
commission to keep informed of the financial management of
the utility and increases the effectiveness of its other powers.
It cannot reasonably be held, however, to include by implication the power to prescribe the terms and conditions of any
transaction that will be reflected in the accounts.
[4] The commission contends that jurisdiction may be
implied from the provisions of section 52 of the act requiring
commission approval of securities issues. It bases this contention on the premise that, by approval of the securities that
Pacific issues, it provides Pacific with a defense to any action
a shareholder might bring to prevent abuse of his interest by
the management, and that therefore it must have the power
to protect minority shareholders from abuses arising out of
contracts made with the majority shareholder, American.
There is nothing in section 52, however, to indicate that commission approval of securities issues operates to deprive minority shareholders of remedies they would otherwise have.
Section 52 provides the extent to which the commission may
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control expenditures under its terms, and this control is:
limited to the use to be made of funds raised by securities'
issues. Pacific, however, is not making these payments from
funds so raised.
.
Section 32 of the act provides that ., Whenever the commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon
complaint, shall find that the rates . . . charged or collected
by any public utility . . . or that the rules, regulations, practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such rates . . • '
are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or
in anywise in violation of any provision of law . . . the com. i
mission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates i
. . . practices or contracts to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
. . ." Section 35 of the act provides for similar powers over
practices of a utility relating to the services it renders. Section
31 of the act provides that" The railroad commission is hereby
vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate
every public utility in the state and to do all things, whether
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are
necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction. " It is contended that the grants of regulatory
power under these sections give the commission jurisdiction
to determine the terms on which Pacific may contract with
American and that the license contract has so much effect
on the rates and services of Pacific that it may be regulated
directly by the commission.
[5] Almost every contract a utility makes is bound to
affect its rates and services. Moreover, the question whether
a contract or practice is reasonable is one on which, except
in clear cases, there is bound to be conflicting evidence and
considerable leeway for conflicting opinions. The determination of what is reasonable in conducting the business of the
utility is the primary responsibility of management. If the
commission is empowered to prescribe the terms of contracts
and the practices of utilities and thus substitute its judgment
as to what is reasonable for that of the management, it is
empowered to undertake the management of all utilities subject to its jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held, however,
that the commission does not have such power. "And, finally,
it may not be amiss to point out that the devotion to a public
use by a person or corporation of property held by them in
ownership does not destroy thplr ownership and does not vest
title to the property in tbe pllblic so as to justify, under the

i
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exercise of police power, the taking away of the management
and control of the property from its owners without compensation, upon the ground that public convenience would
better be served thereby, or that the owners themselves have
proven false or derelict in the performance of their public
duty. Any law or order seeking to do this passes beyond
the ultimate limits of the police power, however vague and
undefined those limits may be." (Pacific Tel. etc. Co. v. Eshle·
man, 166 Cal. 640, 665 [137 P. 1119, Ann. Cas. 1915C 822, 50
L.R.A.N.S. 652] ; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Rat1road Com., 173
Cal. 577, 583 [160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975] ; Hollywood C. of C. v.
Railroad Com., 192 Cal. 307, 310 [219 P. 983, 30 A.L.R. 68) ;
Southern Pac. Co. v. Rat1road Com., 13 Cal.2d 89, 118 [87
P.2d 1055].)
[6] It might, for example, be wise business judgment to
divert profits from the payment of dividends to finance expansion into fields that the utility has not theretofore entered. In
the absence of an enabling statute meeting the requirements of due process, however, the commission cannot require
management to make such choices. (Hollywood C. of C. v.
Railroad Com., 192 Cal. 307 [219 P. 983, 30 A.L.R. 68].)
[7] Similarly, in the absence of a statute granting the commission the power to fix minimum rates to prevent injurious
competition, both this court and the commission have recognized a "zone of reasonableness" within which a carrier can
fix its own rates. It is for the management to decide what
rates within that zone are likely to prove most beneficial to
the carrier. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Rai1road Com., 13 Cal.2d
89,118-119 [87 P.2d 1055].)
[8] Again, there is great public interest in the relations
between labor and management, for wages invariably affect
rates, and disputes over them or other matters are bound to
affect services. Accordingly there has been considerable state
and federal legislation to diminish economic warfare between
labor and management. In the absence of statutory authorization, however, it would hardly be contended that the commis·
sion has power to formulate the labor policies of utilities,
to fix wages or to arbitrate labor disputes.
In other jurisdictions the courts have generally held in
interpreting statutes essentially like that of California that
the commission's control over contracts affecting rates and
services is limited to regulation of contracts that directly affect
the service the rate-payer will receive at a particular rate.

)
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(Illinois Commerce Commission v. East St. Louis & C. Ry. Co.,
361 Ill. 606 [198 N.E. 716, 719] ; Philadelphia City Passenge,.
Ry Co. v. Public Service Commtss10n, 271 Pa. 39 [114 A. 642,
647-648].) Thus, the division of a city into various zones by
a transit company to fix fares directly aff('cts rates. Contracts
whereby the rate drops as consumption increases or wbereby
the liability of a carrier for loss or damage is limited to a
declared value of the goods shipped in consid~ration of a lower
rate directly affect rates. Such contracts and practices affect
the relationship of the utility to the consumer. not its relation.
ship to those who supply it with materials and services.
It is contended. bowever. that the license contract between
Pacific and American is not like ordinary contracts through
which utilities secure materials and services; that because
Pacific and American are affiliated corporations and because
American dominates Pacific, the commission may prescribe
thE' terms of the contract between them.
[9] In the absence of express statutory authority it bas •
generally been held that a commission's control over contracts ,
between affiliated corporations is limited to disallowance of
excessive payments for the purposc of fixing rates. (Philadelphia City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Public Service CommlSStOn,
271 Pa. 39 [114 A. 642, 647-648] ; State ex rel. City of St.
Joseph v. PublIc Service Commission, 325 Mo. 209 [30 S.W.2d
8, 14J ; Lo'l1c Star Gas Co. v.Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 170 Okla. 292 [39 P.2d 547, 553-554J ; see, also, Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. PublIc Utilities Commission, 292 U.S.
398,414-415 [54 S.Ct. 763, 78 L.Ed. 1327, 91 A.L.R 1403] ;
49 Harv.L.Rev. 957, 985; 48 Yale L.J. 1015, 1020.) In the
past the California commission has recognized similar limitations upon its powers. "All this Commission is able to do is to
regulate the amount that is to be allowed in operating expensE'S
as payment to the parent company for services rendered, and
this amount should be in direct proportion to the value of the
services received." (1n re Southern California Telephone Co.,
2] C.RC. 274, 282.) In San Diego v. San Diego Consolidated
Gas & Electric Co., 39 C.RC. 261, where the operating company was admittedly dominated by its parent, the commission
disalJowed part of the intercompany payments in fixing new
rates, but did not order the cessation of such payments. In
In re Pickwick Stages System, 31 C.R.C. 746, the commis. sion under section 52 of thE' act limited the amount an
operating company could pay its holdiug company out of

It'eb.1950]

PAC. TEL.

& TEL. Co. V. PUBLIC
134 C.2d 822; 215 P.2d . .lJ

UTILITIES COM. S31
.

funds derived from a new securities issue for equipment
manufactured by the holding company, but did not prevent
larger payments, requiring only that anything exceeding the
limits it set be charged to surplus.
[10] The commission has thus long been conversant with
the problems presented by affiliated corporations in the field
. of utility regulation. The instant case is apparently the first
in which it has attempted to prescribe the terms and conditions of contracts between affiliates. The policy of the commission in the past not to prescribe the terms of contracts between affiliated corporations is consistent with the provisions
of the Public Utilities Act. There is nothing in the act to
suggest that the contracts of public utilities affecting rates and
services are subject to greater regulation when they are between affiliated corporations than when they are not.
[11] Moreover, there is no basis for such broad jurisdiction
in the principles governing the disregard of a corporate entity.
In the present case the commission is not disregarding completely the separate entities of Pacific and American. It does
not seek to exercise regulatory jurisdiction directly over
American, under the theory that American is in fact the
operating utility subject to its jurisdiction. It recognizes that
American provides Pacific with valuable services for which
Pacific should pay. It would disregard only the terms of the
contract by which it is determined how much Pacific should
pay for the services it receives, and thus substitute its judgment for that of the management as to the reasonable amount
and the method of its computation. Thus the commission is
seeking to disregard the separate corporate entities, not to
exercise more effectively its existing jurisdiction, but to extend
its jurisdiction.
By contracting with American, Pacific is not attempting to evade the jurisdiction of the commission. It is not
making these payments from funds derived from securities
issues, or attempting to evade the commission's regulatory
powers over the expenditures of such funds. (See, In re Pickwick Stages System, 31 C.R.C. 746, 753-754.) Nor is it attempting to evade the prohibition of section 1500 of the Corporations Code against the impairment of capital by the payment of illegal dividends disguised as contract payments.
Under sections 60 and 75 of the act the commission is empowered to stop illegal practices of utilities. If by the device of
a contract for services, American were exacting excessive pay-
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ments that impaired Pacific's capita] and thus weakened its
ability to serve the public, the commission could disregard the
separate corporate entities and treat the excessive payments as
an illegal dividend. (Ohio Oentral Telephone Oorp. v. Public
Ut-ilittes Oom'n., 127 Ohio St. 556 [189 N.E. 650] ; see, Ballantine on Corporations (Rev. ed.) § 142, p. 330; ct., Western
Canal Co. v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 639, 652 [15 P.2d
853].) We do not have such a case before us, however, for
the payments under the license contract are not impairing
Pacific's capita] or affecting its ability to serve the public.
Moreover, in fixing Pacific's rates the commission may disallow
expenditures that it finds unreasonable, thus insuring that
any excessive costs will be met from Pacific's profits. The
effect of the payments on rates and services is no greater than
in any other case where the commission and management disagree on the reasonableness of an expenditure, and the management concludes that it is good business judgment to make
such payments from its profits despite the fact that it cannot
recoup them from its rate payers.
In developing a nationwide telephone service, American
has adopted the legally sanctioned practice of conducting
its'loca} operations through subsidiary operating companies.
It employs a method it considers reasonable in apportioning
the costs of the services rendered by it to its subsidiaries among
them. The contract embodying that method cannot be differentiated from other contracts by which utilities seeure labor,
materials, and services, except on the theory that the judgment of management is suspect on the reasonableness of expenditures in contracts with affiliated corporations as it is not
in other contracts. There is no public policy against affiliated
corporations, however, and the commission can treat them
differently only to the extent the Legislature so provides or
to the extent that they are used as a device to defeat the
exercise of powers the commission has been granted. The Public Utilities Act is silent on the question of affiliated corporations, and only the Legislature can properly decide whether
they present such dangers of abuse that the commission should
have broader regulatory powers over them than it now has.
The order in S.F.17952 and those parts of the order brought
here for review in S.F. 17953 are annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.

)
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SHENK, J .-1 dissent.
Under the plenary power granted to the Legislature by
section 22 of Article XII of the Constitution it was certainly
competent by appropriate legislation to confer upon the
commission the authority to supervise contractual relationships
such as existed between the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company and its owner and corporate master, the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, especially insofar as
contracts affecting rates are concerned. The Legislature has
effectively conferred such power on the commission by section
32 of the Public Utilities Act. By that section the commission
was expressly authorized to find any existing contract affecting
rates to be unreasonable. This power could be exercised as to
expenditures under existing contracts in excess of payments
properly allowable as part of the rate base. But more pertinently, that section also expressly authorized the commission
to determine the reasonableness of contracts affecting rates
thereafter to be observed by the utilities under its jurisdiction.
It is this power that the commission is seeking to exercise
by the orders under review; and in this respect it is reinforced by the general provisions of section 31.
It may be assumed that the commission would be without
power to prescribe in advance the terms and conditions of a
contract and payments thereunder entered into between the
petitioner and another in the normal course of business in
which both parties are acting independently and at arm's
length. But the contract here required to be observed by the
petitioner is not of that character. The independence of action
which is essential in the execution of contracts known to the
law is not present. The real question as I see it is whether
the commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in making the
particular orders and not, as petitioner contends, whether
it was wholly without power to make them.
The facts do not show the exercise of broader regulatory
power than the commission possesses. Nor is this a case where
the petitioner is deprived of the management and control of
its property. We have here nothing more than a regulation
guarding against future excessive payments affecting rates
which could otherwise be imposed upon the petitioner without
its voluntary bargaining participation. By its order the
commission is not exceeding its jurisdiction but is merely
making its jurisdiction effective. In my opinion the particular
contract here ordered to be observed is just such a contract as
34 C.Jd-27
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is contemplated by our law and sound public policy to be '
Imbject to supervision by the commission in the manner proposed. I would affirm the orders.

,>

)

CARTER, J.-l dissent.
The question here presented is not complex. The Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company, an operating communications utility in California, is completely dominated and controlled by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
a New York corporation, whose main function is to hold stock
in and furnish various services to local telephone operating
corporations throughout the country, most of which are con·
trolled by it through stock ownership. American enters into
purported license fee contracts with its numerous affiliates,
including Pacific, under which the affiliates pay a percentage
of their gross revenue for the services to be rendered by
American. It is conceded that in fixing rates for Pacific, our
Public Utilities Commission may ignore the percentage basis
of compensation under those contracts and allow only so much
as is the reasonable value of such services or the cost thereof
to American. The sole question is whether the commission
has authority to approve or disapprove such contracts. I
believe there can be no doubt of such power. It arises (1) by
necessary implication, and (2) by the wording of the Public
Utilities Act.
,
On the first proposition, there are several important con· ~
siderations which must be weighed. It has been aptly said:
"Contracts with operating companies range in subject from
a single activity to a comprehensive scheme giving virtual
domination over the policies of the subsidiary utility. But the
services, even when enumerated at length, are commonly de·
scribed in such general terIDS that no clear picture of those
actually rendered can be obtained from examination of the
contracts . . .
"The profits accruing from the servicing relationship invite
inquiry into the possibilities of abuse inherent in the holding
company structure. In the control possessed by the holding
company, often exercised through common officers or inter·
locking directorates, lies the power to dictate terms and the
consequent danger of unreasonable exactions. The modern
super-holding company system itself furnishes a strong incentive for such exactions. Control over operating companies
through a relatively small investment may be effected by the
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interposition of subholding units, the financing of which can be
facilitated by the issuance of bonds and preferred stock . . •
.. Exploitation of operating companies is detrimental to
both consumer and investor. Although it is seemingly immaterial to the consumer whether the parent obtains income
through high service charges or through dividends resulting
from more economical operations, in fact excessive charges,
unless disallowed by public utility commissions, may adversely
affect him. Overpayments for management services result in
the swelling of operating expenses. When resorted to as a
screen for profits beyond a fair return, they can prevent a
rate reduction, or, by so minimizing the return that only small
profits or none at all are shown, can result in an increase.
And the sums exacted may be so great as to impair service to
the public through lack of funds for maintenance or additions. Furthermore, overcharges for construction or engineering services, reflected in the operating company's capital
account, have a dual effect upon rates: they broaden the base
upon which a fair return must be earned, and enhance costs
of operations by enlarging the amount annually charged to
depreciation, thereby increasing the rate required to yield an
adequate return . . .
"The disallowance of operating expenses increases the net
operating revenue for the purposes of determilrlng the fairness
of the return in a rate case. This increase tends to subject the
utility to lower rates, with the possible consequence of an
ultimate decrease in income that may force a comparable reduction in expenditures." (49 Harv.L.Rev. 957, 959, 978-981,
986.)
It has also been said: "It may be asked why should the
commission, as representative of the consumers be concerned
over a 'raid on the treasury of the operating utility.' Directly
the consumers will not be affected whether the utility is solvent
or insolvent. Their rates are based upon a fair return on a
fair value and it should not matter to them who gets it.
Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the simple facts that
an insolvent utility has no credit with which to obtain the
capital necessary for the continuous expansion of service
demanded from a utility under modern conditions and that
operation of a utility by receivers seems usually to be thought
to result in higher operating expenses than would ordinarily
be incurred. " (Regulation of Utility Contracts,20 St. Louis
JJ. Rev. 1, 58.) Those considerations point up the vital impor-
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tance of the power of the commission to dlSapprove such
contracts as a part of rate regulation 4nd of the aecessity
that the ability of the utility to serve the consumers be not
impaired. I cannot believe that the Legislature intended to
leave the commission impotent to cope with those conditions.
I t may be that some measure of protection is afforded by the
power to refuse to recognize the license fee contract when
fixing rates, but having that power, it of necessity follows
that they may lock the door before the horse is stolen. If they
may affect the utility management indirectly by subsequent action, surely they may take precautionary measures in advance.
The Alabama Utilities Commission has pertinently observed
in this connection: "We cannot conceive that it will be
contended that a Commission is without authority to hnlt a
raid on the treasury of the operating utility on the plea that
it has no right in law to manage the property. From our
point of view, it is not an assertion of management, but rather
an assertion of reasonable control' over practices which the
Commission has a right to prevent and should prevent before
the injury has been done if it is possible for us to arrive there
in time." (See, Be Southern Bell Tel. ct Tel. 00., P.U.R.
1932E, 207.) Certainly it was intended that the commission
would have the power incident, and indeed vital, to protect
the consumer from improvident waste of funds to the detriment of the service. They surely have the power to accomplish
directly that which they may do by indirection. While it may
be that there is no showing in the case at bar that the payments to American here involved will seriously jeopardize
Pacific's consumer service capacity, that is not necessary, for
the situation is so fraught with potential and inherent dangers
that this court should not overrule the commission's judgment
that preventive advance action is necessary. It must be'
remembered that these license fee contracts are not true contracts made at arm's length or on an open market. They are
between corporations, one of which is controlled by the other.
As such they are subject to suspicion and theirefore present
dangerous potentialities. It seems plainly obvious to me that
if payments' for such services are regularly supervised by the
commission, it will not only inure to the consumer's benefit,
but will also put the utility in the advantageous position of
knowing where it stand!'!, thus escaping the risk of making
excessive payments which will not be allowed in its rate base.
That the commission has such implied power is squarely
declared by the Public Utilities Act. •• The railroad com-
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mission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do
all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." (Public Utilities Act,
Stats. 1915, p. ll5, § 31; 2 Deering's Cal. Gen. Laws, Act
6386.)
Secondly, it is clear that section 32 of the Public Utilities
Act, quoted in the majority opinion, must be interpreted 88
empowering the commission to regulate the purported contracts here considered. The literal wording thereof requires it.
Fear is expressed that if the instant contract is subject to
approval by the commission, all other contracts or expenditures of a utility may be scrutinized in advance. Whether
or not that fear is well founded is not necessary to consider.
I say only that the license fee purported contract between
the operating utility and its dominating father, Pacific and
American, may be so treated. There is a clear difference
between HUch arrangements and others. They are not true
contracts made at arm's length. They are definitely subject
to suspicion and potent with possibilities adverse to the interests of the consumers.
It must be conceded that the contract here in question W88
cxecuted by· officials of Pacific who were elected by American
as the principal stockholder of Pacific and owe their allegiance
to American. To say that such a contract is beyond the regulatory power of the Public Utilities Commission, when it may
endanger the ability of Pacific to serve its customers, is a step
backward in the public utility regulation and may open the
door to abuses seriously detrimental to those dependent upon
service from public utilities. While I think it is clear that
the Public Utilities Act expressly empowers the commission
to regulate such contracts in the public interest, there can be
no question that it was the intention of the Legislature to
confer upon the commission all the power necessary to protect
the public interest. This, the majority overlooks in placing
8 strict and strained construction upon the provisions of the
Rct in order to arrive at the conclusion reached.
I would deny the writs and affirm the orders under review.
Respondent's and Real Parties in Interest's petitions for
a rehearing were denied March 27, 1950. Shenk, J., and
Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

